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In this paper, I introduce and elucidate what seems to me the best under-
standing of moral intuition with reference to the intellectual seeming ac-
count. First, I will explain Bengson’s (and Bealer’s) quasi-perceptualist 
account of philosophical intuition in terms of intellectual seeming. I then 
shift from philosophical intuition to moral intuition and will delineate 
Audi’s doxastic account of moral intuition to argue that the intellectual 
seeming account of intuition is superior to the doxastic account of intu-
ition. Next, I argue that we can apply our understanding of the intellec-
tual seeming account of philosophical intuition to the moral intuition. 
To the extent that we can argue for the intellectual seeming account of 
philosophical intuition, we can have the intellectual seeming account of 
moral intuition.
Keywords: Philosophical intuition, moral intuition, intellectual 
seeming, Bealer, Bengson.
1. Introduction
Epistemological moral intuitionism is ordinarily thought of as an ac-
count of non-inferentially justifi ed moral intuitions. In this paper, I 
deal with intuitionists’ mental ontology. I defend the quasi-perceptu-
alist account of philosophical intuition, which understands intuitions 
as intellectual seemings. According to this account, to have an intuition 
that p is to have the intellectual seeming that p. I will say more about 
intellectual seemings and certain shared phenomenological features 
between intuitions and perceptual experiences. In order to do so, I ap-
peal to John Bengson’s view about intuition. Following Bengson (2010), 
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I explain intellectual seemings in terms of “presentation” and “translu-
cency”. Although Bengson echoes almost all that George Bealer (1998) 
believes, Bengson labels his account of intuition “Quasi-Perceptual-
ism”. Bengson puts more weight on the shared phenomenological fea-
tures between intuition and perceptual experience than Bealer did and 
Bengson claims that intuition is fundamentally just like perceptual ex-
perience but is still not sensory experience.
In the next section, I rely on Bengson’s view to outline a quasi-
perceptualist account of philosophical intuition to explain intuition 
in terms of intellectual seemings. However, he recently argues in his 
paper, “The Intellectual Given” (2015), that his perceptualist account 
differs from a seeming account of intuitions, e.g. Bealer’s seeming ac-
count. For example, Bengson says that seemings are not non-volun-
tary, compare to presentations discussed in core quasi-perceptualist 
thesis. Or while a seeming is explicit, i.e. its content is available when 
the content seems true, presentations in core quasi-perceptualist the-
sis can be inexplicit. In this paper, however, I assume that what Beng-
son considers as core quasi-perceptualist thesis can be applicable to 
intellectual seemings. For the sake of argument, the distinction be-
tween core quasi-perceptualist thesis and seeming view is not at stake. 
I believe Bealer’s seeming account and Bengson’s quasi-perceptualist 
thesis can give us important features to explain how moral intuitions 
work in terms of seeming.
After having understood what philosophical intuition is in terms of 
seeming, I then shift from philosophical intuition to moral intuition. I 
will say about Audi’s doxastic account of moral intuition and alterna-
tively explain moral intuitions in terms of quasi-perceptualist account 
which understands moral intuitions as intellectual seemings. In the 
meantime, I argue that the intellectual seeming account of intuition is 
superior to the doxastic account of intuition.
2. Quasi-Perceptualist Account of Philosophical Intuition1
There are some similarities between intuition and perceptual experi-
ences. By perceptual experiences, I assume the standard representa-
tional theory of perception. According to this view, to have a perception 
of an object O as having a property F is to be in a perceptual mental 
state with a phenomenal character which represents O as having the 
property F, i.e. it has representational content that O is F.
Perceptual experiences should be distinguished from inference. In 
making inferences, we often actively practice a number of steps of ex-
plicit reasoning, whereas in perceptual experiences something simply 
comes to us passively. Yet, we can use some inferences to explain why 
we have a particular perceptual experience. Thus, perceptual experi-
ences, in this sense, give us a sense of directness, “givenness” and viv-
1 In writing this section, I was infl uenced by the works of Dancy (2014) and 
Bengson’s doctoral thesis (2010), “The Intellectual Given”.
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idness. Perceptual experiences are examples of non-doxastic states, so 
essentially can involve grounding non-inferential justifi cation for our 
beliefs (see Chappell 2008).
Bengson is impressed by certain phenomenological features shared 
between intuition and perceptual experiences (see Bengson 2015). Of 
course, there are several differences between perceptual experience 
and intuition. For instance, intuition lacks the rich sensory phenom-
enology which most perceptual experiences have (see Williamson 2007: 
217 and Sosa 2007: 48). Also, perceptual experiences are workable only 
in particular cases, while intuition deals both with the particular and 
the general cases (see Hintikka 1999: 137 ff.).
However, there are some abstract similarities between them that 
might be helpful in giving an account of the nature of intuition. For 
example, both perceptual experiences and some intuitions are direct, 
contentful and non-factive states. Suppose I have a sensory experience 
that there is a pen on the table in front of me. So, I am in a state with 
the direct content that there is a pen on the table. But, the experi-
ence might be non-veridical, i.e. not coincide with reality. Even more 
so, some of our intuitions, especially in moral cases, often fail to be 
correct. This must be true, since they so often contradict one another. 
And when one person’s moral intuitions contradict another person’s, at 
least one of these people must have incorrect moral intuitions.
What more can be said about abstract similarities between intuitions 
and perceptual experiences? If intuitions and perceptual experiences 
are, in a certain way, similar, what sort of mental state is intuition?
We can make a distinction among different contentful states in 
terms of representationality and presentationality. Some states such 
as beliefs, perceptual experiences and intuitions are representational 
in the sense that they represent the world in a certain way as if their 
content were true. For example, the belief that “Everest is the highest 
mountain in the world” represents the world in a certain way that its 
content is true. Or one’s moral belief that p, e.g. “surrogate motherhood 
is wrong”, represents the world as being such that p is true, i.e. it is 
not permissible to obtain or to be a surrogate mother. However, some 
states such as hopes, desires and wishes do not represent the world in a 
certain way as if their content were true, although they are contentful, 
since they do not aim to describe the world. For example, my hope that 
“World War III does not happen” does not represent the world in a way 
that its content describes the world. Spelling it out in terms of “direction 
of fi t”, we can say that beliefs aim to fi t the world, but desires, hopes, 
intentions, and so on aim for the world to fi t them (see Searle 1979).
There are also some contentful representational states that are also 
presentational, in the sense that not only do they represent the world 
in a certain way, but also they present the world in a certain way.2 For 
2 We can also think of mere presentational states when we are in pain. 
Presentational states such as pain come to us non-voluntarily and without our 
conscious intention.
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example, when I have a perceptual experience that there is a book in 
front of me, the world is represented to me in a certain way that it is 
true that there is a book in front of me. Furthermore, while I have this 
perceptual experience, it is presented to me (non-inferentially) that 
there is a book in front of me. In fact, I have the (non-inferred) impres-
sion or feeling that there is a book in front of me. Of course, we can have 
this (non-inferred) sense that there is a book in front of me even if it 
turns out that this is not so. For example, Jim Pryor writes about the 
presentationality of perceptual experience as
the peculiar “phenomenal force” or way our experiences have of presenting 
propositions to us. Our experience represents propositions in such a way 
that it “feels as if” we could tell that those propositions are true—and that 
we’re perceiving them to be true—just by virtue of having them so repre-
sented (Pryor 2000: 547).
William Tolhurst (1998: 298–299) also has the same idea in his mind 
when he writes about seeming states as “felt givenness”:
The real difference between seemings and other states that can incline one 
to believe their content is that seemings have the feel of truth, the feel of a 
state whose content reveals how things really are. Their felt givenness typi-
cally leads one to experience believing that things are as they seem as an 
objectively fi tting or proper response to the seeming.
Consider now the famous picture of Mueller Lyer (below). Although the 
unequalness of the two lines is non-voluntarily presented to us, we still 
believe that they are equal as they represent to us in another way. In 
such cases where it is as if something has come to us, we are actually in 
a state that is presentational. This entails that unlike representational 
states, presentational states do not simply represent the world as be-
ing a certain way. Yet they present the world as being that way as if 
things are so. 
Presentational states have at least three characteristics: they are grad-
able, non-voluntary and compelling (see Dancy 2014). They are grad-
able in the sense that their quality may vary from one situation to an-
other situation, depending upon the way in which they are presenting. 
They are non-voluntary in the sense that, unlike decisions (which are 
active), presentational states are passive and happen to us (see Witt-
genstein 1976: 632). They are compelling in the sense that it is hard to 
resist assenting to their contents when they are presented.
Having understood what the difference between presentationality 
and representationality is, we are able to agree that the presentation-
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ality of perceptual experience is not a very challenging idea. We should 
accept that perceptual experiences are presentational states.
However, what about intuitions? Are they presentational states? 
There are some reasons, I believe, to think that intuition is a presenta-
tional state—a state that presents its content as being so. For instance, 
suppose that we have an intuition that it is not possible that both p and 
not-p. When we have this intuition, it is not simply to say that we are in 
a state that represents the world as if the principle of non-contradiction 
is true. We can have just the sense or impression that this principle is 
so. And just like perceptual error that an object x can present itself as a 
y, in case of intuitional error p can present itself as not-p or vice versa. 
For example, we might have an intuition that p because it seems to us 
that p. But after further refl ection or getting confi rmation from a third 
party, we fi nd that we were wrong. 
Thus, although intuition and perceptual experience are different 
and have different properties, they have some similarities and can 
be the same kind of state in terms of presentations. Following Dancy 
(2014) and Bengson (2010), I call this
 The First Quasi-Perceptualist Thesis: (i) Intuitions are akin to 
perceptual experiences in being presentational.
Formulating intuitions in terms of presentationality has different vir-
tues. First of all, this thesis simply makes a distinction between in-
tuition and some other mental states such as guesses, hunches, hy-
potheses, conjectures or beliefs that are merely representational. Just 
as perceptual experiences are typically non-voluntary, intuition is a 
non-voluntary state and can oppose what we believe or are inclined to 
believe. Hence, insofar as intuitions are akin to perceptions in being 
presentations, they are belief-independent.
Moreover, by appealing to the fi rst quasi-perceptualist thesis, we 
reveal another difference. We can make a distinction between intuition 
and dispositions or inclinations such as attractions and temptations. 
Intuitions are presentations, but inclinations are not. As happens in 
the case of wishful thinking, it is possible to have a feeling of being 
inclined to believe that p; however, p is not presented to one as true. 
Thus, the fi rst quasi-perceptualist thesis identifi es a difference between 
intuitions and other phenomena in terms of non-presentationality and 
presentationality.
As a second virtue, the fi rst quasi-perceptualist thesis is able to 
provide us an account for psychological roles of intuition. In fact, the 
thesis explains how intuitions help us to come to believe something 
or form our beliefs. For example, in Jackson’s thought experiment, we 
may form our belief that Mary does learn by having the intuition that 
she does learn. In this sense, intuition has the explanatory power with 
respect to beliefs, i.e. intuitions explain beliefs. For in different situa-
tions we can say “I believe that p on the basis of the intuition that p”. 
Why do we believe that, for example, Mary does learn? Simply because 
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it strikes us that Mary does know or we have the intuition that Mary 
does learn. Therefore, the thesis may explain why we have the corre-
sponding intuitive belief. That intuitions are presentations helps us to 
explain why intuitions are explanatory of belief.
Perceptual experiences also have another characteristic shared 
with intuition, namely, translucency. Bengson explains the idea of 
translucency in this way:
Let us call a presentational state σ of x translucent iff, in having σ, it is 
presented to x that p is so, and there is no content q (where q ≠ p) such that 
it seems to x that p is presented as being so by q’s being presented as being 
so (2010: 38).
Yet, what does it mean when we say a mental state is translucent? 
According to Bengson, calling intuitions translucent is a way of saying 
that intuitions are direct (or non-inferred). However, there is a distinc-
tion in philosophy of perception between “translucent” and “transpar-
ent”. The distinction picks out as translucent a class of experiences that 
are not completely direct or non-inferred. Contrast this with transpar-
ent experiences, where this is not so. For example, when I look at a tree 
or when I introspect my visual experience, my experience is transpar-
ent to me (see Smith 2008). What Bengson must mean by translucent 
experiences is transparent, direct (or non-inferred) experiences.3 Let 
me explain.
Suppose one is sitting in front of a table and there is a pen on the 
table. One’s vision of the pen directly presents the fact that there is a 
pen on the table. Contrast this with the situation that one suddenly no-
tices that the pen’s ink is empty by seeing that the pen does not work. 
It may be presented to such a person that the ink is empty even though 
she lacks perceptual experience of the ink (suppose the ink tank is cov-
ered up). That the pen is not working serves as her “perceptual guide” 
(see Bengson 2010). Most likely, in such a case, one infers that the ink 
is empty from the fact that the pen is not working. One thinks that the 
best explanation of the pen’s not working is that the ink has run out, 
and so one makes the inference about the ink. This entails that the 
presentation of the pen as being out of ink is not direct (translucent).4
We can think of this distinction between direct or translucent pre-
sentation and indirect presentation, in the intellectual cases, as well. 
Consider the intuition that “identity is transitive”. This intuition is 
translucent in the sense that it is presented to one as being the case that 
identity is transitive. It does not present to one as being so by something 
else (other propositions) being presented so. It seems that one can “just 
see”, directly, that it is so. However, there are intuitions which do not 
have this directness or are not translucent, especially cases in which one 
may be presented with multiple contents, some of which hold in virtue 
3 For the sake of argument, this distinction is not at stake here. I treat “translucent” 
as if it means “transparent” in this paper and use them interchangeably.
4 For another example, see Dretske (1969: 153 ff.).
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of the others. In effect, translucency has two components: presentation 
and directness, which bring the epistemic status of being un-inferred.5 
Note: that some presentation is translucent and thus un-inferred does 
not imply that its content cannot be inferred as well.
In the light of the discussion of translucency, we can now add an-
other constituent to the quasi-perceptualist thesis. I call this 
 The Second Quasi-Perceptualist Thesis: (ii) Intuitions are intel-
lectual translucent states.
But how is this “intellectual” state generated? Why do not we postu-
late intuitions as sensory or perceptual states? One might even object 
that intellectual states are completely non-sensory because they do not 
involve sense data. If this is the case, it seems that all we have said so 
far about the certain shared phenomenological features between intel-
lectual seemings and perceptual experiences is redundant.
The answer is that, although intuitions are similar to perception in 
terms of translucency and presentation, intuitions cannot be just sen-
sory perceptual states. We can also think of two negative and positive 
readings of an intellectual state: a negative reading of an intellectual 
state equates “intellectual” with completely non-sensory. However, a 
positive conception reads an intellectual state as a state that involves 
the deployment or exercise of concepts. The quasi-perceptualist does not 
need to choose between these two readings. Therefore, the quasi-per-
ceptualist thesis is “neutral” on this issue (see Bengson 2010).6
Hence, combining the two constituents of the quasi-perceptualist 
thesis, i.e. (i) and (ii), yields the core idea of quasi-perceptualism about 
intuition. This can be formulated as
 The Quasi-Perceptualist Theory of Intuition: Intuitions are 
translucent intellectual presentations.
Although quasi-perceptualism explains intuition with terminology dif-
ferent from that used by Bealer (2000), I think they are both saying 
the same thing. In other words, Bengson tries to elaborate what Bealer 
means when he uses intellectual seemings. And by seemings, in Beng-
son’s terminology, Bealer means something direct or translucent and 
presentational.
We should bear in mind that nothing we have said implies that 
intuitions must be unrefl ective or gut feelings.7 Rather, a translucent 
intellectual presentation with certain content may occur in the case 
of substantial refl ection. But through this refl ection, intuitions do not 
5 I elsewhere argued for the epistemology of moral intuitionism on the basis of 
“non-inferred epistemological intuitionism”. See Dabbagh (2017).
6 I do not deny that there is a tradition of philosophers such as Kant, Sellars, and 
McDowell etc. who think that perceptual states involve the deployment of concepts. 
For example, when I see a tree in front of me I have deployed the concept of a tree. 
My claim here is compatible with what they said.
7 See Prinz (2006) for an alternative view.
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need to make a transition from one proposition to the second one, be-
cause they are translucent.8
So far, I have given an explanation—and to some extent justifi ca-
tion—of what a philosophical intuition is. It is now time to examine 
whether quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuition in terms 
of seeming is applicable to moral intuition. I argue we can have a seem-
ing account of moral intuition as well.
3. Shifting from Philosophical Intuition to Moral 
Intuition: The Seeming Account of Moral Intuition
Having discussed what philosophical intuition is, we now direct our 
focus to what moral intuition is. Jennifer Nado (2012) distinguishes 
between epistemological intuition and moral intuition and argues that 
the mental states falling under the category of intuition are quite het-
erogeneous. In almost the same manner, I assume here that it is plau-
sible to think of two separate types of intuition with different content 
as “philosophical intuition” and “moral intuition”. However, I do not be-
lieve that philosophical intuition and moral intuition are not two differ-
ent types of mental state. For having different content does not make 
something a different mental state. The nature of moral intuitions and 
philosophical intuitions and how they work to justify our beliefs are the 
same. Thus, the characteristics that we attribute to philosophical in-
tuitions can also be attributed to moral intuitions. Yet, we can make a 
distinction between philosophical and moral intuition, in terms of their 
different content, and this distinction between philosophical and moral 
intuition helps us to focus solely on moral intuition.
The term “ethical intuition” or “moral intuition” has often raised 
diffi culties in the history of moral philosophy. Some moral philoso-
phers think that the term “moral intuition” refers to a moral judgement 
shared by philosophers and scholars. Some of these philosophers think 
that moral intuition is just immediate or non-inferential moral judge-
ments. Some others think of moral intuition as a pre-theoretical judge-
ment. Another understanding refers to philosophers who think about 
moral intuitions as apparent and self-evident truths.9 For example, no-
tably, Robert Audi describes moral intuition as a doxastic state about a 
self-evident proposition.10
Below, I will delineate Audi’s doxastic account of moral intuition to 
argue that the seeming account of intuition is better than the doxastic 
account of intuition. I will partly argue against Audi’s account of moral 
8 This translucency is like non-inferentiality in the case of propositional belief.
9 I have used Lillehammer’s (2011) various “conceptions of ethical intuition” 
here.
10 This does not entail that, Audi believes, we cannot have intuitions about 
non-self-evident propositions. We can have intuitions that are not intuitions of self-
evident propositions. See Audi (1996: 109–110).
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intuition that the seeming account of moral intuition can do better a job 
than his doxastic account. I then discuss an alternative.
3.1. Audi on the Nature of Moral Intuition
According to Audi, a moral intuition should have at least four condi-
tions (listed below). Although Audi talks about four conditions, it seems 
that the “pre-theoretical” condition entails the “directness” condition. 
For, in Audi’s view, if an intuition is not held or believed on the basis of 
a premise or theoretical hypothesis, it must be non-inferential.
(1) First, a moral intuition must be non-inferential (directness requirement). 
This means that “the intuited proposition in question is not—at the time it 
is intuitively held—believed on the basis of a premise” (2004: 33). (2) Sec-
ond, moral intuitions must be fi rm cognitions (fi rmness requirement). This 
means that “intuitions are typically beliefs, including cases of knowing”; 
however, “[a] mere inclination to believe is not an intuition” (2004: 34). A 
moral intuition must have some degree of epistemic weight, i.e. conviction. 
(3) Third, a moral intuition must be shaped by an adequate understanding 
of its propositional object (comprehension requirement). An adequate under-
standing for a belief “tends both to produce cognitive fi rmness and to en-
hance evidential value” (2004: 34–35). (4) Fourth, moral intuitions must be 
pre-theoretical (pre-theoretical requirement). Moral intuitions are not like 
theoretical hypotheses, nor do they depend being inferred from theories. So, 
“… an intuition as such… is held neither on the basis of a premise nor as a 
theoretical hypothesis” (2004: 35).11
Nevertheless, moral intuitions are defeasible. They can be defeated by 
some theoretical results that are incompatible with the moral intuition 
(see Audi 1996: 110). By accepting the defeasibility of moral intuitions, 
Audi tries to distinguish between reliable and unreliable moral intu-
itions through entering the notion of justifi cation. According to him, 
reliable moral intuitions are those that “we can rationally hope will re-
main credible as we continue to refl ect on them” (1996: 121). Of course, 
Audi does not suggest that what makes certain moral intuitions reli-
able is that we rationally hope they will remain credible as we refl ect 
on them. What he must have meant is that we rationally hope that 
the moral intuitions that are reliable will remain credible as we refl ect 
on them. For a moral intuition to remain credible as we refl ect on it 
is for it to be “stable under refl ection”. Reliability and stability under 
refl ection are different things. What makes a moral intuition reliable, 
in Audi’s view, is that it normally or nearly always leads to the truth. 
In fact, some moral intuitions are reliable, as having initial credibility 
and as themselves being prima facie justifi ed. Audi says that insofar as 
moral intuitions
11 Audi elsewhere states that his focus on intuitions is on empirical quasi-
perceptual intuitions: “My concern will be only empirical intuitions and mainly 
quasi-perceptual intuitive moral judgments” (2007: 201). But how are moral 
intuitions empirical ones? I am not sure what Audi means by this, especially when 
he thinks intuitions are identifi ed with a priori ones!
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are like certain perceptual beliefs (e.g. in being non-inferential, “natural,” 
and pre-theoretical)—and perhaps more important—insofar as they are 
based on an understanding of their propositional objects, there is reason to 
consider them prima facie justifi ed (Audi 1996: 116).
So understood, in Audi’s view, moral intuition simpliciter can be reli-
able, has initial credibility, and can be considered as prima facie justi-
fi ed, but on one condition: moral intuitions must be formed in light of 
an adequate understanding. If they are not based on suffi cient refl ec-
tion, we lack reason to consider them prima facie justifi ed.
Moreover, pre-theoreticality of moral intuitions does not imply that 
the propositional content of a moral intuition is not capable of proof and 
inferential justifi cation. It is not true that a non-inferential cognition 
cannot be believed as a theoretical hypothesis (see Audi 2004: 35–36; 
1996: 112 and 1998: 23).
In Audi’s view, to give a plausible account of moral intuition, we 
need the idea of “refl ection”. In order to do that, he distinguishes be-
tween a conclusion of inference and conclusion of refl ection. A conclu-
sion of inference is “premised on propositions one has noted as evi-
dence” (1998: 19). Simply put, a conclusion from one or more evidential 
premises is a conclusion of inference. In contrast, a conclusion of re-
fl ection “emerges from thinking …but not from one or more evidential 
premises” (1998: 19). To give a better idea of what the conclusion of 
refl ection is, Audi compares it to looking at a painting or seeing a facial 
expression. When a conclusion of refl ection emerges, one can obtain 
a view of the whole and characterise it (see Audi 2004: 45–47). Moral 
intuitions, Audi holds, should be known as conclusions of refl ection. 
The conception of moral intuition, then, is that moral intuition is a 
non-inferential cognitive capacity, not a non-refl ective one (see Audi 
1996: 112 and 1998: 20). However, as Audi rightly observes, this does 
not imply that “every intuitive moral judgment need be a conclusion of 
refl ection” (2007: 204).
It is clear from Audi’s defi nition that moral intuitions have an epis-
temological feature as well as a normative one. A moral intuition is 
something that is totally dependent on the level of understanding of 
each person and is not necessarily obvious to all. Rather, it may be re-
jected or become clearer in the course of theorising. Also, as Audi puts 
it, moral intuitions must be understood here in a cognitive sense (see 
Audi 2004: 32). Moral intuitions have an epistemic role in our judge-
ments and they have effects on our beliefs, i.e. they lead us to know 
some moral principles and believe in them.
Audi sees a sort of connection between moral intuition and self-ev-
ident propositions. He believes that moral intuitions are typically our 
beliefs about some self-evident moral principles, and there are some 
moral self-evident principles that we have moral intuitions (beliefs) 
about (see Audi, 1996; 1998; and 2004). For example, in Audi’s view, 
the moral intuition that “promise-keeping is permissible” is typically 
our belief about the self-evident principle that “promise-keeping is pro 
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tanto right”. Furthermore, we have a moral intuition about the self-
evident proposition “promise-keeping is pro tanto right”, which is intui-
tively true. Of course, this does not entail that all moral intuitions are 
self-evident propositions.
Although adopting the doxastic account of intuition has different 
advantages, I believe, the seeming account is superior. The seeming 
account of moral intuition can help us to distinguish intuition from cer-
tain similar mental states, such as guesses, gut reactions, hunches and 
common-sense beliefs. The reason that I advocate the seeming account 
is that it looks more fundamental than the doxastic account. We can 
explain why we believe various things by saying that they seem true to 
us. In other words, even in cases where we believe something, we actu-
ally believe it because it seems true to us. Although seeming p true to 
me is a decent reason for my believing p, believing p is not an enough 
reason for me to believe p.
3.2. Moral Intuitions as Seeming States: 
Can Bengson’s Account be Applied to the Moral Domain?
Moral intuitionists like Michael Huemer understand intuition in terms 
of seeming states or as an “initial intellectual appearance” (2005: 101–
105). Moral intuition, on the basis of this understanding, is an initial 
intellectual appearance with moral content.12 In what follows, I will 
focus on the psychology of moral intuition generally and try to answer 
the question of “what are moral intuitions like” specifi cally.
Three main questions about moral intuitions can be distinguished, 
Sidgwick believes. One is a question about existence (psychology). The 
second is a question about validity (epistemology). The third is a ques-
tion about origin (see Sidgwick 1967: Book 3, Ch. 1, at 211). The ques-
tion about existence is a psychological question asking whether it is 
possible for people to ever have a moral intuition. The question about 
validity is an epistemological question seeking truth in such moral in-
tuitions. The question about origin, fi nally, is a question of what the 
nature of moral intuition is and how moral intuition is developed.
Although an answer to the question about existence can be affected 
by what we think a moral intuition is, Sidgwick rightly thought that 
the question about existence and the question about moral intuition’s 
nature should be kept separate. By listing some states of mind that can 
be confused with intuitions, Sidgwick directs our attention to the ques-
tion of what exactly intuition, and specifi cally moral intuition, is. He 
starts off by asking what the difference between moral intuition and 
blind impulses or vague preferences is. And he fi nally ends up talking 
about moral intuition as “judgment or apparent perception that an act 
is in itself right or good” (1967: Book 3, Ch. 1, §4). However, he cannot 
endorse that this is the defi nition of moral intuition. For there are some 
12 See also McMahan (2000: 93–4). For a discussion of two views on moral 
intuitions, see Bedke (2008).
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examples that even Sidgwick knows of as fundamental intuitions, but 
they do not have such content! Consider his intuition that it cannot 
be right for person A to treat others in a certain way and not right for 
person B to treat others in that same way unless there is some relevant 
difference between A and B or their situations, beyond the bare fact 
that A is A and B is B. Another is his intuition that from the point 
of view of the universe no one person’s good can matter any more or 
less than any other person’s good, apart from their effects on others. 
Neither of these intuitions holds that an act is in itself right or good.13
But, if it is true that moral intuitions are not judgement or appar-
ent perception that an act is in itself right or good, what phenomenon, 
event or state is moral intuition? As I discussed before, recent work 
in philosophical intuition by Bengson (and Bealer) understands philo-
sophical intuitions as intellectual seemings. Intellectual seemings are 
similar to perceptual experiences, though important differences should 
be taken into account. For instance, perceptual experiences are con-
scious, contentful, non-factive and presentational. And since they are 
presentational, they differ from belief or judgement. In being presen-
tational states, they are baseless, gradable, fundamentally non-vol-
untary and compelling. Bealer, whose works in this area are seminal, 
discusses philosophical intuitions only in four domains: the conceptual, 
the logical, the mathematical and the modal. Perhaps we do not need to 
determine whether Bealer’s account of intuition is suitable for the four 
domains of philosophical intuitions he is interested in. Our question is 
whether his discussions are appropriate for intuitions in ethics. Bealer 
does not apply his account explicitly to ethics. Nevertheless, Bealer’s 
four domains can be used as an argument for the view that moral intu-
itions can be treated as evidence, as I will explain below.
Bengson’s work, which is a development of Bealer’s ideas, also does 
not clearly discuss moral intuition’s mental ontology. Although both 
Bealer and Bengson do not clearly apply their theory to ethics, I think 
Bealer’s or Bengson’s account of intuition can make space for the ontol-
ogy of moral intuitions. In the next paragraphs, I run through Bealer’s 
and Bengson’s accounts of the ontology of philosophical intuitions to 
provide an account of moral intuition.
Let us start with the psychological question about moral intuition. 
Borrowing Bengson’s account of philosophical intuition, we can ask 
whether we have conscious, contentful, non-factive and presentational 
states with moral content. Do we have such mental states in ethics? 
The answer to these questions, I think, is simple. It is clear for us that 
at some point we have conscious, contentful, non-factive and presen-
tational states with moral content (e.g. promise breaking is wrong). 
These are states with moral content that fi t the general account of the 
presentational state.
13 Sidgwick believes that at least some intuitions can occur, in principle, without 
being true. He, for example, admits “the possibility that any such “intuition” may 
turn out to have an element of error” (1967, Book 3, Ch. 1, §4).
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Now if moral intuitions so defi ned exist, what is the nature of mor-
al intuition? According to Bengson’s view, intuitions are intellectual 
seemings, or to put it more accurately, intuitions are translucent pre-
sentational states. But are moral intuitions intellectual seemings? 
There is a decisive reason for believing in seemings with moral con-
tent, I believe.14 We should admit that at least some moral intuitions 
are intellectual seemings. Consider, for example, the following proposi-
tions: “it seems that killing innocent people for no reason is absolutely 
wrong”; “it is wrong to torture someone for one’s own amusement”; 
“that an act would hurt an innocent person must count morally against 
it”; “that an act would reduce the pain an innocent being is suffering 
counts morally in favour of it”. Insofar as one adequately understands 
the conceptual constituents, one can be struck by the seeming right-
ness of these propositions. Consideration of these propositions produc-
es intellectual seemings with moral content. In effect, what makes an 
intuition a moral one is an intellectual seeming with moral content.
Yet, one might object that what get produced are beliefs not intellec-
tual seemings. The reply should be that these propositions match the 
contents of the intellectual seemings. For example, suppose we have a 
proposition (P) and suppose further that the proposition seems to us to 
be true. Then the proposition matches the content of our intellectual 
seeming.
Moral intuitions are similar to philosophical intuitions in that they 
are seeming states but with different contents. And in so being, one 
might believe that moral intuitions can present a consideration as evi-
dence (which provides reason). And to present a consideration as evi-
dence (which provides reason) is to present it as favouring a response of 
a certain sort.15 On this account, some moral intuitions or intellectual 
seemings present propositions as true (facts) and generate evidences 
for this or that sort of response. The seemingness of moral intuition, 
which is associated with some phenomenological features such as a 
feeling or appropriateness, can provide evidence for us.
How intuitions, generally, can be treated as evidence? Bealer (1992) 
famously writes about the three Cs to answer the question of wheth-
er intuition can be a source of evidence. Here are the three criteria: 
Consistency, Corroboration and Confi rmation. The consistency test ex-
plores whether one intuition is consistent with other intuitions. The 
corroboration test asks whether one person’s intuition is corroborat-
ed by others’ intuitions. And the confi rmation test seeks to establish 
whether those intuitions are confi rmed by observation or experience.
But if the seemingness of moral intuition can provide evidence, a 
plausible objection could be raised. The objection is that there is no dif-
ference between moral intuitions and emotions in presenting evidence 
14 Huemer (2007: 30–35), for instance, believes that any epistemological theory 
which denies the justifi catory power of seemings with moral content is self-defeating.
15 See Dancy (2014).
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(which provides reason), since at least certain emotions do this. So, 
if emotions seem to present the person who has them with evidence 
(which provides reason), are at least some moral emotions in fact moral 
intuitions? The answer is that moral intuitions are not emotions at all. 
This is because intuitions are purely intellectual seemings and hence 
truth-apt, yet emotions are not. Although further investigation is need-
ed to have an account of emotion, my conjecture would be that some 
emotions can be like seeming states, and in being so they are similar to 
moral intuitions; and among those, the moral ones are similar to moral 
intuitions.
Understanding moral intuition with reference to seeming states, I 
think, can easily bring us at least some degree of justifi cation. For ex-
ample, if you have seemings about p and there is no defeater against p, 
you are to some degree justifi ed in believing p based on that seeming.16 
And if there is an explanation of how moral intuitions can serve as evi-
dence in philosophy, this at least can give us a prima facie justifi cation 
for using them.
4. Conclusion
I have investigated about the nature of moral intuition. I started with 
explaining the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuition in 
terms of seeming. I focused on Bengson’s (and Bealer’s) intellectual 
seeming account and elaborated what the intellectual seeming is by 
appealing to Bengson’s theory of quasi-perceptualism. Following Beng-
son, I considered presentational states as “immediate apprehensions” 
and allowed the notion of translucence to serve as an explanation of 
the notion of “directness”. Consequently, I now have a conception of 
philosophical intuition as a kind of direct, immediate apprehension 
akin to perceptual experience, though it includes intellectual concepts. 
I also showed that intellectual seemings are translucent intellectual 
presentations. I then argued for reading moral intuitions in terms of 
Bengson’s (and Bealer’s) account of intellectual seemings. I showed 
that the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuition which 
understands intuitions as seemings can be applicable to moral intu-
ition. Therefore, we now can have a conception of moral intuition in 
terms of intellectual seemings similar to perceptual experiences.
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